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INTRODUCTION 
“A system of power must have three sources, it needs to be fed with three things: money, ideology 
and votes. Now one big governing party will rise; one central political force that will be capable of 
representing national interests – but without permanent debate.”1 
 
 “Pole and Hungarian cousins be” – starts the historic proverb in both languages. They fight 
together, and they build illiberal democracy together – could one rephrase the original version, as the 
two countries seem to have elected governments with very similar political agendas. Both Viktor 
Orbán’s Fidesz and Kaczyński’s PiS can be classified as a right-wing populist government with 
economically left-populist social policies, utilising all available methods in order to strengthen their 
positions and to stay in power. 
Acknowledging the conceptual difficulties in defining populism, this paper uses that of 
Mudde, which describes the concept as “a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated onto two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the 
corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté general (general 
will) of the people”.2 
PiS and Fidesz do not explicitly state who belongs to the circle of ”the pure people” - they 
create this fictitious group through their political narratives. Through this division they manufacture 
a fake political legitimacy which they can constantly refer back to – posing as the sole representatives 
and defenders of people's general will. In order to create this fictitious group, both governments are 																																																								
1Quote from Viktor Orbán's speech in 2010, translated and quoted by Péter-Bajomi Lázár in Bajomi-Lazar, P.(2014). 
Party Colonisation of the Media in Central and Eastern Europe: Modern Business Decision Making in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press. 
2Mudde, 2004, p. 543 as quoted in Wodak, R. (2013). Right-wing populism in Europe: politics and discourse. A&C 
Black. 
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using right-wing ideological narratives on three different community levels; levels of the 
sacral/religious community, national community and family as a community. 
An ideology's effectiveness relies on two key conditions: the conditions of credibility, and 
the condition of effective mystification 3 . The more thoroughly a single ceremonial system 
monopolizes the public domain, the better it realizes its mystifying function; in other words the 
suppression of the ideology's practical purposes for its producers. 
Public discourse is shaped through various factors; this paper focuses explicitly on the two 
governments' treatment of the media landscape, as it is the biggest and most effective platform for 
this purpose. The paper argues that both Fidesz and PiS are attempting to capture the state and 
private media, using these to propagate their political ideology. Thus by monopolising media 
discourse and portraying themselves as the representatives of the people on all three symbolic levels, 
the two governments attempt to discredit any civil or parliamentary opposition group, and emerge as 
the sole central political force domestically. The aim of this paper is to compare the extent to which 
the Fidesz and PiS government managed to succeed in this attempt to the present day. 
First the paper presents a brief systemic description of Fidesz’s and PiS’ general modus 
operandi, comparing their parliamentary and legislative powers and ideologies. These are necessary 
in order to correctly understand similarities and differences in the two governments’ treatment of 
the media. 
Second, it analyses the cases of Hungarian and Polish media state capture under the Fidesz 
and PiS governments and the extent to which the parties were able to shape their countries' 
domestic media landscape. 
Third, the paper compares in detail the three ideological levels of public discourse in the two 
governments' narrative and provides examples on how they are propagated by Fidesz and PiS in the 
public domain. 
Fourth, it presents the ways through which the state capture of the media influences public 
discourse - methods allowed by the two governments' increased media influence, which they are 
using to propagate their three-levelled narrative. 
Finally, the paper concludes by observing opinion polls, voting preferences and value 
surveys in order to evaluate and compare the two governments' success to become a central political 
force domestically, by shaping public opinion through their increased their influence over the public 																																																								
3 Jan, K. (1994). The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power. The Rise of. (p. 249) 	
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discourse. 
I. SYSTEMIC SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUNGARY AND POLAND – MAFIA 
STATE VERSUS CONSERVATIVE SEMI-AUTOCRACY  
As previously stated, both PiS and Fidesz can be classed as right-wing populist governments, 
applying similar ideological panels in their political narratives – both rejecting the standard values of 
left liberalism, building on an autocratic top-down relationship between state and nation rather than 
on individual values. Whereas PiS had been committed to these values since the party's foundation, 
Orbán's Fidesz can be classified as an ideology-using regime. Rather than the ideology being the 
driver of its actions, it chooses its temporary ideological stance based on its current political goals. 
Using Janos Kornai’s system typology4 in order to classify the Hungarian and Polish regimes, 
one can conclude that Hungary’s regime is an autocracy, whereas Poland is a democratic regime 
currently in transition towards an autocratic one. All primary characteristics of a democratic regime 
are available in Poland5, however there were steps taken by the PiS government against a number of 
the secondary characteristics; namely against the freedom of press, against the independence of 
institutions acting as checks and balances, and against limited state appointments to public positions. 
Fidesz also surpasses PiS in terms of decision-making power, which provided the party with 
greater room for political manoeuvring. In 2010 Fidesz won a supermajority in the Hungarian 
elections, giving the party constitutional powers, mainly used to eradicate the system of checks and 
balances. Whilst PiS won a parliamentary majority in 2015, its opportunities for changing the balance 
of Polish legislative, executive and judicative powers were far more limited than Fidesz’s.  As a 
result, in Hungary political decision-making is actually happening outside parliamentary means, into 
the hands of the informal circle of “political family”. As a contrast, in Poland political decision-
making still largely happens within the traditional institutional norms of parliamentary democracy. 
																																																								
4Kornai J.(2016) The system paradigm revisited: Clarifications and additions in the light of experiences in the post-
socialist region." Acta Oeconomica,vol. 66 (4), pp. 547–596.  
5 Primary characteristics: 1)The government can be removed through a peaceful and civilized procedure 2)Institutions 
which jointly guarantee the conditions of removing the government are strong 3) Legal parliamentary opposition exists; 
multiple parties run for elections 4) No terror (large-scale detention in forced-labour camps and executions) 	
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Under Fidesz, state-level corruption largely increased, which led to the emergence of a 
handful of beneficiary cronies. In the case of PiS, no similar systemic tendencies are observed up to 
this date, the party’s anti-corruption commitment is strong since its foundation. There are no 
apparent attempts at to change the business elite of the country or to create a group of powerful 
oligarchs loyal to the government. 
In summary, PiS is currently attempting to build an ideologically driven Conservative Semi-
Autocracy. Fidesz, in contrast, have created the ideology-utilising Hungarian Mafia State, a system of 
top-down state level corruption headed by the governing party. These systemic dissimilarities result 
in different methods to achieve media colonisation and differences in the extent to which the two 
governments managed to take over the media landscape. 
II. STATE CAPTURE OF THE MEDIA IN HUNGARY AND IN POLAND 
One of the key agenda points of both parties is to use mass media outlets in order to promote their 
political ideology in public discourse. By taking over the public media sphere directly and extorting 
pressure on the private media outlets indirectly, the governing parties in both Poland and Hungary 
can manipulate discourse in the public domain and to a large extent monopolise political truth in 
their respective countries. 
Looking at Freedom House’s and Reporters without Borders’ (RSF) media freedom ratings 
for 2016, it might appear that the two countries’ media landscapes are fundamentally different, 
Poland being in the “Free”6 category in both rankings, whilst Hungary falling in the category of 
countries with “Partly Free”7 press. Taking a closer look at recent tendencies in scores and rankings 
tell a slightly different and more worrying story. Poland fell a total of 29 places in the global media 
freedom ranking of RSF in 20168, and is only 3 points away from receiving a “Partly Free” ranking 
from Freedom House – the sudden drop in Poland's results came as a reaction from the institutions 
to the changes introduced by the PiS government after winning the parliamentary elections in 2015. 
Both parties have a history of governance marked by confrontation with critical public 
media. Viktor Orbán’s first coalition government (1998-2012) argued that communist networks still 																																																								
6https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/poland (last accessed 14th of December 2016) 
7https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/hungary (last accessed 14th of December 2016) 
8https://rsf.org/en/poland (last accessed 17th of December 2016) 
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persisted in public media, which made the ‘rebalancing’ of the system inevitable. The coalition, 
however, did not have the necessary two-thirds of the votes to change media regulation, therefore it 
was limited ‘only’ to political purges in the media, redistributing of state funding and reallocation of 
board positions of state media councils to loyal party servants.9 
PiS first formed a minority government (2005), then became part of a majority coalition 
(2006-2007), as a partner of SRP (Defence of Republic of Poland) and LPR (League of Polish 
Families), headed by Jaroslaw Kaczyński. Under a similar slogan to Fidesz's, referencing the alleged 
existence of communist networks in the media, PiS changed the media law shortly after its election. 
The coalition succeeded to change the nomination process to the National Broadcasting Council 
(and through that also to other management boards of national Television and Radio, since they 
were appointed by the council). The new members elected to the National Broadcasting Council all 
had ties to the governing parties. As a result of changed supervisory and board structures, the news 
coverage of Polish media became heavily influenced by political pressure, which showed in a 2 point 
increase in the country’s Freedom House score, and also a downgrade by Reporters without borders 
– much like in 2016.10 
In 2010, Fidesz gained a constitutional supermajority in alliance with the Christian 
Democrats in the Hungarian elections, whilst PiS was elected in 2015 with an outright majority (the 
first time for any Polish party since 1989) – and as expected, as a result of extensive political power, 
there were a number of similar steps taken by both governments to maximise their influence over 
the media. This section analyses the two regime's treatment of the media, which show similarities to 
a great extent, however as a result of systemic differences between Hungary and Poland, they also 
diverge to a certain extent. 
SIMILARITIES 
Media Law(s): Both Fidesz and PiS started their second reign in power with forcing through a new 
media law as early as possible – in both cases this happened without consultation with either the 
opposition, or with independent professional organisations, and resulted in a substantial increase in 
government media domination. 																																																								
9Bajomi-Lazar, P.(2014) p.52-54 
10Bajomi-Lazar, P.(2014) p 124-133 
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Fidesz gained regulatory control over all media platforms through a new Multimedia Act and 
Media constitution 11 , and also appointed a new supervisory body (National Media and 
Telecommunications Authority), with all four of its board members appointed by the government. 
The body was in charge of content monitoring and frequency distribution, whilst the newly created 
Media Fund was responsible for the funding of public service broadcasters. As both the National 
Media and Telecommunications Authority and the Media Council was both chaired by Annamária 
Szalai (appointed by Viktor Orbán himself), and the Media Fund’s director was appointed by the 
chair of the Media Council, Fidesz virtually managed to achieve a monopolistic control over media 
legislation, content monitoring, frequency distribution and distribution of state media funding. 
PiS’ Small Media Act12 (Mała Ustawa Medialna), which came into effect in January 2016, 
changed the existing administrative status quo, terminating the mandates of all the current CEOs 
and executive boards of public media companies, also shifting operation and oversight of the public 
broadcasting system, from the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT) directly to the Polish 
government - namely to the Treasury Minister, Dawid Jackiewicz.  This includes the right to hire and 
fire journalists and editors, and appoint Members of Board of Management. Many long serving 
public media officials resigned as a protest against the government crackdown on media 
independence. 
The Small Media Act was passed as part of a larger public media reform plan, and was meant 
to be followed by a “Large Media Act” on the 1st of July 2016; however the plan was postponed, 
since “the far reaching changes require notification of the European Union, which takes time”.13 A 
bridge law was also put in place in the intermediate period on the 22nd of June14, according to which 
public broadcasters will be transformed from commercial companies into national media institutions 
and public media boards will be selected by a six-member National Media Council elected by the 
Sejm, Senate and president for a six-year term. 
																																																								
11Bajomi-Lazar, P.(2014) p.55-62 
12BBC, Polish media laws: Government takes control of state media,  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
35257105, last accessed on  the 15th of December 2016 
13Polish Press Agency: Introduction of key media law postponed - Minister Czabanski http://www.pap.pl/en/news-
/news,538255,introduction-of-key-media-law-postponed---minister-czabanski.html last accessed on 14th of December 
2016 
14National Broadcasting Council, Act on the National Media Council enters into force  http://www.krrit.gov.pl/en/for-
journalists/press-releases/news,2355,act-on-the-national-media-council-enters-into-force.html last accessed on the 17th 
of December 2016 
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In summary, it can be observed that both governments used the available maximum of its 
legislative power to restructure public media oversight system and to put its own people in key 
decision-making board positions. 
 
State funding of the media: Another method of increasing state influence on media outlets is 
changing the dynamics of state-related media funding, both coming directly from the government 
and through state-owned enterprises. This bears the risk that media empires that are politically 
connected become stronger financially as commercial revenues are re-directed towards openly 
politicized media outlets. Although both Hungarian and Polish media relies heavily on state-related 
funding, it has to be noted that in Poland, as a result of a bigger media market and larger foreign 
share of outlets, the impact of shifts in allocation of state spending is relatively smaller. 
In Hungary, since 2010 the public sector's advertising spending has mirrored changes in the 
political climate and had been decided based on the current stance of state-oligarch relationship. A 
public conflict between Viktor Orbán and Lajos Simicska (a media tycoon and oligarch) in 2014 is a 
prime example of this process. Since the fallout, a considerable reshape of the Hungarian media 
landscape occurred. Since the start of the fallout, state advertising revenues of Simicska's companies 
dropped significantly15, as the distribution of state advertisement was now aimed at promoting the 
interests of emerging oligarchs with freshly acquired or established outlets. 
As well as reshaping the media landscape based on political decisions, there is an overall 
tendency that the state media is receiving a continuously growing share of state media advertising, 
which has a further market distorting effect. According to Mérték Média's report, in 2015 the total 
state aid for public media was 47% higher than the total estimated revenue of private media outlets.16 
In Poland, a similar state shift in state advertisement distribution can be observed. Gazeta 
Wyborcza, the biggest opposition daily saw its advertising revenue drop 14.9% from March 2015 to 
March 201617, almost three times the industry average. Its decreased revenues come partly as the 
result of its circulation reducing by around 10,000 copies a day as a result of its ban from judicial 
buildings and many ministries. In the same time period, government-friendly daily Rzeczpospolita 																																																								
15Mérték Media: The methods are old, the cronies are new: Soft censorship in the Hungarian media in 2015 - 
http://mertek.eu/en/reports/soft-censorship-hungary-2015 p. 28-29 
1616Mérték Media: The methods are old, the cronies are new: Soft censorship in the Hungarian media in 2015 - 
http://mertek.eu/en/reports/soft-censorship-hungary-2015 p. 36 
17Wirtualne Media: Reklamy w dziennikach: „Rzeczpospolita” z największym wzrostem, „Fakt” i „Super Express” 
mocno w dół http://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/reklamy-w-dziennikach-rzeczpospolita-z-najwiekszym-wzrostem-
fakt-i-super-express-mocno-w-dol last accessed on 9th of December 2016 
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saw its advertising revenues increase by as much as 49.8% during the same time period. Table 1 
observes the changes in state-owned company spending from Q1 2015 to Q2 2016 – government 
critical Gazeta Wyborcza was one of the biggest losers of the shift – receiving 1.5 million złotys less 
than in the previous year. 
 
 
1. Table State-owned enterprise Top 5 advertisement spending changes in Poland between Q1 2015-2016 – 
Kantar Media Data 
 
Right-wing magazine Gazeta Polska received almost 3 million złotys more in 2016, than in 
the previous year – a 287% year-on year increase18, whilst declining in weekly readership. Publishers 
and journalists both suffer from the advertisement shift, since the government is clearly supporting 
papers with smaller circulation, which back its political agenda. 
Ministries and state-owned companies also significantly redistributed their TV advertisement 
spending since 2015. Two of the biggest losers of the shift in spending were TVN and TVN2419, 
both government critical channels whose state revenues dropped 40-50% according to Kantar media 
data. 
In short, based on available data in the two countries, both the PiS and Fidesz governments 
are utilising state advertisement funds to promote their political agenda by extorting indirect political 
pressure, without the slightest sign of aiming to achieve opinion plurality. 
																																																								
18Wirtualne Media, „Gazeta Polska” i „W Sieci” dużo więcej z reklam, najbardziej w dół „Polityka” i „Tygodnik 
Powszechny” http://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/gazeta-polska-i-w-sieci-duzo-wiecej-z-reklam-najbardziej-w-dol-
polityka-i-tygodnik-powszechny last accessed on the 10th of December 2016 
19Wirtualne Media, TVP2 wyprzedziła TVP1 pod względem wpływów reklamowych. Liderem Polsat, 
http://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/tvp2-wyprzedzila-tvp1-pod-wzgledem-wplywow-reklamowych-liderem-polsat 
last accessed on the 8th of December 2016 
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DIFFERENCES 
As described above, there were a number of similar steps taken by the two governments, and the 
general directions followed by PiS and Fidesz are almost identical. There are, however, important 
differences to be noted. 
First of all, he Polish media market is much larger and more polarized with a greater share of 
the outlets owned privately, mainly by foreign investors. This makes the overall media landscape less 
sensitive to domestic political shifts than   it is in Hungary. Nonetheless, according to latest data 
34% of viewership belongs to state media, which is a more than significant market share. 
Secondly, Fidesz's supermajority enabled it to remove checks and balances more effectively 
and gather more significant legislative power than PiS, which is also reflected the extent of legislative 
state capture. Fidesz has tools like introducing special taxes20 (as they did with TV channels, 
imposing disproportionately heavy taxes on foreign-owned RTL Klub TV) or the distribution of 
radio frequencies. These tools allow Fidesz a more effective total war against partisan outlets, 
especially in the private sector. 
Lastly, as a result of both systemic and ideological differences summarized in the previous 
section, PiS (unlike Fidesz)  to present day does not have a circle of loyal oligarchs, who would have 
the power to take over private outlets. In contrast Hungary's private media landscape is being 
shaped by Fidesz's recently emerged oligarchs, with Lőrinc Mészáros, Andy Vajna, and Árpád 
Habony all building their respective government-backing media empires. Following the speedy 
acquisition of numerous newspapers and TV stations21, a telling joke started to circulate on the 
internet, which best describes the pace of oligarch takeover. 
 
 - Wife: Lőrinc darling, where have you been? 
 - Lőrinc Mészáros: Sorry honey just popped out to get the papers. 
 
As the PiS government lacks a developed network of cronies for private media takeover, in 
order to change the media landscape it openly promotes the “re-Polonisation” of private media. 																																																								
20BBC, Has Hungary made peace with RTL Klub TV?, http://www.bbc.co.uk/monitoring/has-hungary-made-peace-
with-rtl-klub-tv , last accessed on the 13th of December 2016 
21A timeline of oligarch media capture is available in Hungarian at 
http://index.hu/aktak/mediahaboru_jobboldali_media_simicska_lajos_tv2_andy_vajna_habony_arpad/ , last accessed 
on 5th of December 2016 
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Under this slogan the government is admittedly to buy out foreign owners of private media outlets 
using state money, thus further increasing media influence in the future. 
Overall, although the Fidesz government has six years advantage and superior political 
power, the PiS government is trying to use all available methods in order to catch up in the race of 
monopolizing the media as fast as possible – not the best prospect for the future. 
The following section analyses the two governments’ three levels of symbolic ideological 
narrative, which they propagate in the public domain, mainly through their increased media 
influence. 
III. THE IDEA OF THE CENTRAL POLITICAL FORCE AND ITS SUPPORTING NARRATIVES 
Fidesz's and PiS' ideological similarities are not a coincidence, but a result of the same end goal by 
the two governments: to become the single central political force domestically. 
Orbán has been propagating the idea since 2010, stating that the existence of dual (or 
multiple) political forces will necessarily result in permanent debate and thus it slows down 
development. There is a need therefore of a single central political force, capable of representing 
national interest – but without being in permanent debate with other parties over ideological values 
and political goals22. 
Bálint Magyar argues that one of the main reasons of the opposition's failure in Hungary was 
that parties failed to provide credible ideological alternatives, challenging Fidesz's narrative on three 
different community levels: the spiritual/religious community level, the nation as a community level 
and the level of the family as community.23 As well as agreeing with Magyar's claim, this paper also 
argues that by taking over public discourse, and in particular capturing the media, both Fidesz and 
PiS are 
 
 - Actively seeking to promote their ideology through propagating their  ideological 
position on the three community-creating levels 
																																																								
22Viktor, O 2010, Kotcse speech, transcript in Hungarian available on http://www.hirextra.hu/2010/02/18/megorizni-
a-letezes-magyar-minoseget-orban-kotcsei-beszede-szorol-szora/ , last accessed on the 30th of November 2016 
23Magyar, B. (2016). Post-Communist Mafia State. Central European University Press.(p 27-31) 
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 - Creating moral dualities across these three levels – portraying anyone  who  does 
not agree with the government narrative as morally wrong 
 - Actively seeking to prevent opposing forces to provide and present their  alternative 
narrative about these ideological levels 
 
Through creating these three levels of moral dualities and increasingly monopolizing discussion over 
them in the media, both Fidesz and PiS seek to delegitimize and discredit their political opposition, 
thereby emerging as the only morally acceptable party representing the will of “the people” - an 
unchallenged central political force. The following section describes the three levels of symbolic 
narratives and ways in which are propagated in the public discourse. 
THE RELIGIOUS LEVEL 
Both governments are using religion to further legitimize their regime – portraying themselves as not 
only having the approval of the Nation (the people), but also the approval of God. 
In strongly religious Poland, PiS historically received direct or indirect endorsements from 
the Roman Catholic Church and it was no other way in 2015. “The priest does not tell people which 
political party to support,’’...“but he advises us to vote for a politician who is a good Catholic, from a 
party that represents the ideals of the church. Everyone knows.’’24 - said Józef Grochowski, mayor 
of a small farming community, prior to the 2015 elections, a statement summarizing recent trends in 
Polish politics.  The implicit endorsement of the church was particularly helpful in the conservative-
religious rural areas, where PiS' strong performance25 (46.8% of the votes) helped the party to 
achieve a outright majority in parliament. 
Since the elections the tight church-state alliance continued. PiS Lawmakers for example sent 
to committee an Abortion bill proposed by the church, which would mean a near-total ban on 
abortions. A PiS-proposed bill intended to limit in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) was also sent to 
committee. The bill was symbolic in particular, as legislation allowing IVF was passed in Sejm early 																																																								
24 As quoted in Duval Smith, A. Guardian: In deepest rural Poland, politics is shaped by love of church … and hatred of 
Brussels, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/25/law-and-justice-poland-drift-to-right, last accessed on 5th 
of December 2016 
25Wojtasik, W. , Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Parliamentary elections 2015 in Poland: trends and tactics, 
https://www.boell.de/en/2016/02/16/parliamentary-elections-2015-poland-trends-and-tactics, last accessed on 14th of 
December 2016 
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2015, during the PO government, therefore proposing a bill reversing this legislation can be seen as 
attempt for the ideological discreditation of PO. 
As a result of the powerful Czarny protests, parliament did not actually accept the proposals, 
however government rhetoric still points to the same general direction of the state championing the 
church's agenda and monopolizing religious discourse. Kaczyński, despite the defeat in parliament 
said that PiS “will strive to ensure that even in pregnancies when a child is sure to die, strongly 
deformed, women end up giving birth so that the child can be baptised, buried, and have a name”.26 
An event from November 2016 best summarizes the (often absurd) ways of further building 
the symbolic relationship between state and church; Jesus Christ was proclaimed to be King of 
Poland by President Andrzej Duda and by Catholic Bishops. 27 
In comparison, Hungarian society is fairly secularized, nevertheless being identified with the 
Christian religion plays an important part in providing sacral legitimacy for Fidesz’s regime. Fidesz 
also makes “religious references to signal their traditional social values and identification with the 
societal mainstream”28. The country’s Fundamental Law states that Hungary is a country based on 
Christian values, and in 2011, the adoption of the new Fidesz constitution in Easter Monday had 
been bizarrely compared to the resurrection of Jesus.  In order to highlight its friendly approach 
towards the Christian church even more, Fidesz also established a strategic alliance with KDNP 
(Christian Democratic People’s Party) – giving their politicians influential government positions in  
return for their “marketing image contribution”. 
As Bozóki points out, Orbán uses Christian-religious and pagan-nationalist symbols 
simultaneously and interchangeably, thereby attempting to “Christianize” pre-Christian ancient 
Hungarian symbols, whilst “paganizing” Christianity. The main aim of this phenomenon is to win 
over voters from far-right Jobbik's camp, who are mainly atheists, and whose mythical symbol 
system relies much more on traditional pre-Christian Hungarian motives like the Turul bird. Mixing 
traditional pagan and Christian values allows voters on a much wider spectrum to identify with 
Fidesz's spiritual narrative. 																																																								
26Walker, P., The Independent, Poland abortion laws: Ruling party to revive ban despite mass strike by women and 
defeat in parliament http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/abortion-ban-poland-warsaw-parliament-
vote-party-jaroslaw-Kaczyński-pis-a7358036.html , last accessed on the 14th of December 2016 
27Gazeta.Pl: Oficjalnie: Jezus Chrystus "Królem Polski". Prezydent, posłowie i 6 tys. ludzi wzięło udział w 
uroczystości http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/7,114883,21000510,tlumy-na-intronizacji-jezusa-na-krola-polski-
uroczystosc-trwa.html 
28 Bozóki, A., and Zoltán Á. "State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in 
Hungary." Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics 2.1 (2016).  
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Their strong religious narrative enables Fidesz and PiS to create a transcendental moral 
duality where they are the ones representing the will of the collective of “the people” as a sacred 
entity. Whoever speaks up against actions or policies is not only attacking them within the political 
sphere – but is also acting against the will of God. 
THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
The second level of the narrative is the nation as a community. Here the creation of moral duality 
and a similar monopolization of truth can be observed as on the spiritual/religious level in both 
countries. This level provides legitimacy for Fidesz and PiS governments, that whatever political 
goals they are pursuing, they are doing it for the greater interest of the country, legitimized to do so 
by its citizens. 
Those who disagree with them are referred to as “traitors”, “servers of foreign interests”, 
“the worst sort of Poles”, “Soros-agents”29 and a number of other similarly creative labels. The 
direction of monopolizing representation of the national interest can be best summed up in a 
sentence which Orbán used in one of his speeches in as early as 2002, after Fidesz lost the general 
elections: “We will not be in opposition, as the mother country (haza) cannot be in opposition”.30 
This ideological narrative is particularly strong in Hungary's public discourse, where the 
government  set up the “System of National Cooperation”, established National Tobacco shops, 
renamed the (now) National Tax and Customs Administration and countless other state institutions. 
As Klára Sándor points out31, by simultaneously using the phrases “Fidesz” and “Nation”, the 
government is trying to overlap the two concepts, suggesting that any voices criticising the 
government cannot be coming from within the “real” nation - excluding opposition forces from this 
second collective entity level as well. 
																																																								
29Reference to George Soros; a Hungarian-born multimillionaire, financial investor and philanthropist. According to 
right-wing narratives, uses his wealth to destabilize Europe. The irony in these claims coming from Orbán is  that he 
himself received a grant to study abroad as a university student 
30Viktor Orbán, public speech, full transcript available on: http://members.xoom.it/hunok2/h0013.html , last accessed 
on 28th of November 2016 
31 Sándor, K., Miért nemzeti a trafik? 
http://galamus.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=219953:miert-nemzeti-a-trafik-
218926&catid=68&Itemid=133 , last accessed on 13th of December 2016 
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In order to canonise its nationalist narrative, the PiS government places   the main focus on 
reinterpreting historical events and historical figures. Allegations relating to Lech Walesa's past 
portraying him as a communist puppet, giving a blasphemous portrayal of Adam Michnik in state 
media on his 70th birthday, re-interpreting Poland's role in Holocaust and in the Second World 
War32, exhuming the body of Lech Kaczyński's body who died in the Smolensk plane crash, 
interfering with the war museum in Gdansk33  - all steps in the creation of a new historical approach, 
celebrating PiS-style nationalism. 
Nonetheless, both countries claim to have received legitimacy from the “real' nation – a 
collective entity which they lead and protect by all their policies.  In order to maintain this image of 
Dux et Protector of the nation it is necessary to have internal and external “enemies”, from which the 
nation can be protected by its strong leaders. 
Opposition parties and civil organisations critical towards the government are portrayed as 
the internal enemies – constantly working to undermine the work and great results of the 
government. External enemies are to a large extent common in the case of both countries: Brussels 
and migrants. Both Kaczyński and Orbán like to appear as  the leader fighting off the Brussel 
bureaucrats on the western front, while at the same time defending the country’s eastern border 
from the inflow of migrants and fighting corrupt opposition politicians domestically. 
By this constant enemy-creation Fidesz and PiS have successfully positioned themselves as 
the only morally appropriate and legitimate party serving national interests, anyone who opposes 
them therefore, must be acting against the will of the nation per se. 
THE FAMILY LEVEL 
The third and symbolic community forming level of narrative is the level of the family. Using the 
two higher levels of religious-spiritual and national communities, both governments are promoting 
the image of their desired family model: heterosexual and married with (ideally multiple) kids. This 
family image is the combination of traditional Christian values and the ideology of saving the nation 
from extinction as a result of falling birth rate. 																																																								
32Financial Times: Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s party is rewriting the history of Poland, 
https://www.ft.com/content/67532c78-e62d-11e5-a09b-1f8b0d268c39 , last accessed on the 15th of December 2016 
33Financial Times, The use and misuse of history in Poland, https://www.ft.com/content/b59698fa-0e02-11e6-b41f-
0beb7e589515 , last accessed on the 15th of December 2016 
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Two example interviews show what typical views on a “proper family” are in the two 
governments' narrative.  When asked about single mothers, who do not benefit from the Family 500 
+ programme (described below), PiS spokeswoman, Beata Mazurek said that she would encourage 
them “to stabilize their family situation and have more children”.34 László Kövér, a Fidesz politician 
named the highest level of female self-fulfilment as giving birth to children.35 
Both governments distribute generous social benefits to married couples with 2 or more 
children; PiS campaigned with Family 500+ (Rodzina 500 plus), a monthly allowance of 500 złotys 
per month to families after their second and every subsequent child until the age of 18. In Hungary, 
a similar campaign started at the end of 2015 named CSOK (Családi Otthonteremtési Kedvezmény 
– Family Home-Creating Discount), thanks to which young married couples can get up to 20 million 
forints from the government as an aid towards their home purchase. 
Another key electorate group targeted with generous policies within the family level of 
narrative are pensioners. One of PiS’ key election pledges was for example to re-lower the retirement 
age to its previous levels after it had been increased by the PO-PSL government in 2012. Orbán, 
acting like Hungary’s very own Santa Claus, announced that in 2016 all pensioners will receive a 
10,000 Forint (approximately £30) voucher from the government for Christmas. Simultaneously, 
Fidesz announced a 1.6% increase in state pensions in 2017. 
These steps are heavily boosting both governments’ popularity in the circle of pensioners - 
one of the largest unified blocks of voters. They can also be fit nicely into the traditional family 
narrative. Hungary’s mini-campaign slogan in the words of Viktor Orbán: “This is a gesture, 
showing our respect to the pensioners.”36 
In summary, both governments build on a traditional Christian family model, underpinned 
with the nationalist aim of preserving ethno-national purity of the state by giving birth. Fidesz and 
PiS support this family image by associating populist social policies with these values. This leads to a 
moral justification of their stance on this symbolic community level, as the two governments appear 
as the sole protector and representative of family values, of the elderly and of the children. Naturally, 
																																																								
34TVN24 - "Mieć więcej dzieci". Rzecznik klubu PiS radzi samotnym matkom bez 500 plus , 
http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/poslanka-pis-radzi-samotnym-matkom-bez-500-plus,616053.html , last 
accessed on the 12th of December 2016 
35Magyar Nemzet Online, Vihart kavartak Kövér László szavai, http://mno.hu/politika/vihart-kavartak-kover-laszlo-
szavai-1319148 , last accessed on the 19th of December 2016 
36MTV – Híradó, http://www.hirado.hu/2016/11/29/Orbán-16-szazalekos-emeles-10-ezer-forintos-erzsebet-utalvany-
a-nyugdijasoknak/ , last accessed on the 19th of December 2016 
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anti-government voices are portrayed as morally wrong, being directed against traditional family 
values and against the interest of the families.  
IV. GOVERNMENT INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC DISCOURSE THROUGH THE MEDIA 
In both countries, governments are using their increased media influence over public (and to some 
extent private) outlets to propagate their political ideology in public discourse, interpreting events in 
light of the religious, nationalist and family narrative levels. To present the methods of “truth-
monopolization” in public discourse, this section will first discuss the extent to which political 
parties and their opinions are represented in the media, then it will analyse the enforcement of the 
three-levelled government narrative in state-captured media outlets. 
PARTY REPRESENTATION IN THE MEDIA 
Based on a quantitative analysis carried out by the Polish National Broadcasting Council 
(KRiiT)37, there had been a significant shift in TVP's representation of opinions of different parties, 
since PiS came into power. Table 1 shows the growing disparities, comparing the media coverage of 
the government and the main opposition party in the first two quarters of 2015 and that of 2016. 
As the Table shows, there had been a bias towards PO during 2015, and historically Polish state 
television had been biased towards the government, as they received a larger share of coverage time. 
Since PiS obtained the outright majority and passed its media bill, differences became much more 
pronounced than before. Whereas in the second quarter of 2015, right before the elections, the main 
opposition party's position was represented only 40% less than the government party's (PO 43h57m 
and PiS 26h17m), in the second quarter of 2016 the same measure is 73% (PiS 83h23m and PO 
22h30m); the government's opinion was presented 3.7 times as much as the main opposition 
parties’. 
 
																																																								
37National Broadcasting Council, http://www.krrit.gov.pl/krrit/aktualnosci/news,2383,niepokojace-dysproporcje-w-
prezentowaniu-partii-politycznych-w-tvp.html , last accessed on the 14th of December 2016 
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2. Table Time for presentation for PO's and PiS' opinion in TVP, during Q1 and Q2 of 2015 and 2016 
(Hours) - Although there were imbalances in state media during the PO government, under PiS the 
discrepancies became much more pronounced 
 
In Hungary, a similar shift occurred in state media coverage after Fidesz's election win. A telling 
statistics can be observed in Table 2. Content analysis of the state-owned M1's evening news bulletin 
showed that only 2 opposition and 2 independent politicians were amongst the 20 most covered 
politicians in the bulletin, the rest 16 were tied to the Fidesz-KDNP alliance. In 2008, on the same 
list 10 politicians were from the socialist MSZP government, the other 10 on the list were 
opposition MPs or independent politicians. 
 
3. Table Coverage time (seconds) of the top 20 most covered politicians during a two-week period in M1's 
evening news bulletin (Republikon Institute data) – Colour coded based on party-affiliation. Orange – Fidesz, 
Red – MSZP, Green – LMP, Grey – Independent. 
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According to the same study the Fidesz-KDNP alliance took up 83% of news time during the 
evening news bulletin, receiving 10 times as much airtime than MSZP, one of the main opposition 
parties. 
The fact that opposition parties receive little or no airtime on a significant on state-owned 
media platforms makes their chance to counter the government's propaganda and its symbolic 
narratives extremely narrow. Politicians from the opposition receive little opportunity to influence 
public discourse through explaining events in light of their own narratives, challenging the governing 
party's “monopoly of truth”. 
SUPPORTING THE THREE LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY  
Both governments openly aimed to reshape media narratives according to their own ideologies. In 
an interview 38  , Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski stressed the importance of 
promoting values such as “patriotism, faith in God, in a normal family life between husband and 
wife”, fitting into the three level populist narrative of the two governments. Students of College of 
Social and Media Culture under agreed with the minister, expecting changes under “new 
management and under a law that will force public media channels to “respect Christian values”, and 
“act in favour of strengthening of families”39 
Since their elections, both governments increased their support towards religious outlets in 
the media through funding or legislation.  In Hungary, the National Media Council – headed by 
Fidesz – is responsible for allocating radio frequencies. According to Mérték Média's reports, the 
distribution of frequencies heavily favoured religious outlets – in 2010-2011, more than a third of 
allocated frequencies was received by a station with substantial religious agenda, whereas in 2012-
2013, the same number was 48%. 
In Poland, there is no opportunity for such direct government support; however the most 
substantial religious platforms do receive financial aid from government circles. Lux Veritas 
																																																								
38News Observer Online, Polish Govt. to Crush Marxists in State Media, http://newobserveronline.com/polish-govt-
to-crush-marxists-in-state-media/ , last accessed on the 19th of December 2016 
39Financial Times, Poland: An inconvenient truth, https://www.ft.com/content/4344ca44-0b94-11e6-9cd4-
2be898308be3 , Last accessed on the 14th of December 2016 
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Foundation, chaired by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, received 26 million złotys in March 201640.  Rydzyk 
is also heading the ultra-conservative Radio Maryja radio and Telewizja Trwam TV stations, both 
frequent hosts of PiS politicians, supporters of the government, often spreading homophobic and 
Islamophobic propaganda as part of their catholic Christian agenda. 
With the growing market share and budget of media outlets with strong Christian agendas 
and close ties with the government, the sacralisation of the nation and association of its political 
agenda with Christian values and symbols are to a large extent being monopolized by Fidesz and 
PiS. 
 
 
4. Table Percentage of time that supports or promotes a position that is different to the government’s (8th – 
22nd September 2016) 
 
The migrant crisis was a perfect fit for both the religious and nationalist levels of narrative. The 
government portrayed refugees as a threat to Hungary from a national perspective, and a threat to 
Christian Hungary from a religious point of view. A study by Democracy Reporting International41 
revealed the striking extent to which some Hungarian media outlets represented the government's 
opinion in their news bulletins during the campaign period before Hungary's October Referendum 
on EU migrant quotas’. Table 4 shows the percentage of time that channels supported or promoted 
the government’s position during the campaign build-up. M1, a main state-owned channel produced 																																																								
40TV24 - Jest ugoda. 26 milionów złotych odszkodowania dla fundacji o. Rydzyka, http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-
kraju,3/fundacja-o-rydzyka-odzyskala-miliony-zlotych-za-odwiert,621375.html , last accessed on the 19th of December 
2016 
41Democracy Reporting International, Hungary’s state-owned TV shows bias in EU-refugee referendum, 
http://democracy-reporting.org/?p=2450 , last accessed on the 5th of December 2016 
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a staggering 91%, whilst the supposedly private, but oligarch-owned TV2 a similarly one-sided 86% 
support rate – not exactly the epitome opinion pluralism. 
A similar tendency can be observed in Poland, where the PiS government launched a heavy 
anti-EU, anti-migrant campaign through state owned media. As summarized in a KRiiT analysis 
based on 8 episodes of TVP's main news bulletin: 
“The news show the world as monocentric, strongly narrowed down to the political sphere, with 
tensions between the ruling camp and the political opposition. The program emphasizes the positive 
effects of government action. (...) There is a strong tendency to build a sense of threat from external 
forces (immigrants, Russia) and internal (the opposition, "the previous government"), which in total 
gives an image of the world as a doubly besieged fortress”42 
The family level narrative is tied in with the distributive policies of the two governments, families 
and the elderly being pictured in the media as the main beneficiaries of the supposedly great 
economic performance, increasing the regime’s ideological credibility. 
 
The model for all franchised projects is the same: the children are asked the usual set of questions 
about their country, families, religion, love, education and hopes for the future as they grow up. 
However, the project’s impact turns out to be deeper than one might expect from such trivial 
beginnings. It develops into a commanding perspect 
V. HOW WELL DOES THE THREE-LEVELLED IDEOLOGY WORK? THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
CENTRAL POLITICAL FORCE 
Looking at recent opinion polls in both countries, the Fidesz and PiS governments managed 
to secure a massive lead, with no serious challenge by a fragmented opposition. According to the 
most recent surveys, both parties measure between 29-35%, a large lead compared to opposition 
parties – for representation, the paper uses survey results from CBOS and Nézőpont, as their scores 
were the closest of other surveys' mean results. 
 																																																								
42Kowalski, W. Na:Temat, Analiza KRRiT nie pozostawia złudzeń, że "Wiadomości" mają problem z bezstronnością. 
TVP odpowiada: To polityczny atak, http://natemat.pl/177063,analiza-krrit-nie-pozostawia-zludzen-wiadomosci-maja-
problem-z-bezstronnoscia-tvp-odpowiada-to-polityczny-atak, last accessed on the 28th of November 2016 
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5. Table Voter's preferences in Hungary (percent), 12.2016 - Nézőpont data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Table Voter's preferences in Poland (percent), 12.2016 - CBOS data 
 
A large part of the poll lead which the governments are maintaining was built up during the 
refugee crisis, with both parties benefitting enormously from their Eurosceptic and anti-refugee 
stance on the matter. Policy reports' analysis showed how the support for Fidesz and PiS grew 
significantly from March 2015 to January 2016, as both put increased emphasis on the right wing 
elements of political narrative. PiS support increased by 12%, and the share of voters supporting 
Fidesz went up by 11% during this period.43 
As a result of the shift in political narratives and one-sided coverage, nationalist and anti-
migrant sentiments grew significantly in both countries44. Tables 6 and 7 show that Hungarian and 																																																								
43Policy Solution, Political Communication of the refugee crisis in Central Eastern Europe (2016) 
44 Pew Research Center, Wike R., Stokes B., Simmons K. , Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More 
Terrorism, Fewer Jobs, http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-
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Polish societies now have some of the strongest nationalist and anti-migrant sentiments in Europe, 
with the highest percentage of respondents thinking that increased immigration will lead to an 
increase in terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Table Views on National Identity vary across Europe – Pew Research Data from the Spring 2016 Value 
Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Table Refugees in our country will increase the likelihood of terrorism - Pew Research Data from the Spring 
2016 Value Survey 
 
The other opinion-shaping and support-increasing tool is the populist distributive approach 
of the Fidesz and PiS governments. As a result of one-sided and oversimplified media presentation, 
these policies enjoy an overwhelming support from the countries' electorate, regardless of their 
questionable economic sustainability. 																																																																																																																																																																																		
terrorism-fewer-jobs/ , last accessed on the 10th of December 2016 
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In a CBOS survey conducted in February 2016, 80% of respondents supported ‘500 plus’, 
including 62% of ‘Modern’ voters and 65% of PO supporters, while only 15% of the respondents 
were against it45.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The strong religious and nationalist narratives, coupled with the family narrative being tied to 
populist redistributive policies resulted in a large and relatively stable support for the two 
governments and a fragmentation of the opposition parties in both countries, regardless of 
numerous signs of autocratic tendencies, recent constitutional crises and corruption scandals. 
The differing parliamentary power of Fidesz and PiS meant in a different extent to which the 
two parties were able to capture media (both public and private outlets) and thus in the extent to 
which they were able to monopolize public discourse. As a result of this there is a somewhat less 
fragmented opposition and more active civil society in Poland. 
In Hungary, Simicska's media empire is constantly being attacked by the Fidesz government 
and it has been largely reduced, whilst the system of checks and balances had been built down 
completely – the central political force took over the political landscape. 
Although the Polish political outlook is not as gloomy as Hungary's; as long as PiS is able to 
keep up its widely popular social pledges economically, it is expected to retain the support of the 
electoral majority, especially in the religious-conservative rural areas. In the meantime, the PiS 
government is working on the systemic removal of democratic checks and balances and the Large 
Media Plan - albeit delayed - is still in plan. The EU intervention was successful in temporarily 
delaying the Large Media Act in Poland, however the Union does not appear to be ready to trigger 
any particular sanctions against Poland, therefore the problem needs to be solved domestically. 
The clock is ticking. The opposition forces of the two countries will have to come up with 
credible counter-narratives on all three ideological levels, and will have to find platforms on which 
they can effectively spread these counter-narratives. If they fail to do so, the emergence of the 
unchallenged central political force will be inevitable and irreversible in both countries – until their 
money lasts. 																																																								
45CBOS, Program „Rodzina 500 plus” jako element systemu wspierania rodzin i dzietności (February 2016) 
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